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Abstract
This paper argues that the German system of vocational training is undergoing subtle 
but significant changes from a mainly collectivist system to a more segmentalist one. To 
make the argument, the paper first discusses the two logics of collectivism and segmen-
talism, and how the German system is characterized by longstanding tensions between 
competing collectivist and segmentalist interests. In the empirical section, recent trends 
in the German system are portrayed to show that the system’s segmentalist dimension 
has been strengthened at the expense of its collectivist dimension. These trends can be 
seen from developments in the participation of firms in training and from the chang-
ing politics of vocational training reform. To buttress our argument, we present three 
case studies on the debate over the modularization and Europeanization of vocational 
training, on the (re)introduction of two-year apprenticeships and on the unfolding 
conflict on vocational exams respectively. Before we conclude, we highlight parallels in 
contemporary trends in vocational training and changes in other realms of the German 
political economy. 
Zusammenfassung
Dieses Papier dokumentiert den graduellen, aber transformativen Wandel des deutschen 
Berufsbildungssystems von einem kollektivistischen zu einem stärker segmentalisti-
schen Modell. Zunächst wird gezeigt, dass die beiden Logiken des Kollektivismus und 
des Segmentalismus in der Geschichte der beruflichen Bildung schon immer in einem 
Spannungsverhältnis standen. Im empirischen Teil wird gezeigt, dass die segmentalisti-
sche Dimension während der letzen drei Jahrzehnte gegenüber der kollektivistischen an 
Bedeutung gewonnen hat. Dies wird anhand der Entwicklung der Ausbildungsbeteili-
gung von Unternehmen sowie der Politik der beruflichen Bildung dokumentiert. Insbe-
sondere werden drei Fallstudien zur Debatte über Modularisierung und Europäisierung 
der beruflichen Bildung, zur (Wieder-)Einführung zweijähriger Ausbildungsberufe und 
zum sich anbahnenden Konflikt über die Organisation von Prüfungen präsentiert. Ab-
schließend werden Parallelen zwischen dem Wandel der beruflichen Bildung und den 
Arbeitsbeziehungen im Allgemeinen herausgearbeitet.
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1 Introduction
The German vocational training system has long been viewed as a key institutional sup-
port sustaining the competitive strength of German manufacturing and admired as a 
model solution to the knotty coordination and collective action problems that chroni-
cally plague private sector training regimes (Finegold/Soskice 1988; Streeck 1989; Hall/
Soskice 2001; Cusack/Iversen/Soskice 2007). Unlike in the so-called ‘liberal’ market 
economies of the Anglo-Saxon world, the German system has traditionally supported 
very high levels of firm-sponsored (and firm-funded) training. At the same time, and 
unlike other enterprise-based training systems such as those found in Japan, the Ger-
man model embodies strong collectivist elements that guarantee that this training con-
forms to standards, in both quality and content, which are established and enforced at 
the national level. 
This is a popular system. While other political-institutional arrangements in Germany 
(such as centralized wage bargaining) have been under intense pressure in recent years, 
the vocational training system still seems to command the strong support of all the 
major actors – unions and business, and political parties of left, right and centre. The 
apparent consensus and continued popularity of the system, however, have not been 
enough to prevent a noticeable twofold drift: (1) in the direction of a less encompassing 
system, due especially to its overall failure to adapt to the decline of manufacturing, and 
(2) towards a less collectivist, more segmentalist model of skill formation – a model that 
was explicitly, though apparently not definitively, defeated historically at the turn of the 
last century (Thelen 2004). At the inception and during the early development of the 
German training system, the primacy of manufacturing and the institutionalization of 
industry-wide bargaining were both crucial to promoting a system based on skill stan-
dardization and certification. Today, the decline of manufacturing is driving an overall 
shrinkage in the system, at the same time as the erosion of collective bargaining and 
the reactivation of old cleavages – both across industries and between them, especially 
between large firms and small and medium-sized enterprises – has provided the context 
for segmentalist tendencies to re-emerge. 
Because of the heterogeneity of Germany’s industrial structure (featuring a number 
of large dominant enterprises but including as well a sizeable and vibrant small and 
medium-sized enterprises sector), the common characterization of Germany as an ex-
ample of a ‘specific skill’ regime (Hall/Soskice 2001; Estevez-Abe et al. 2001) almost by 
definition glosses over important differences between economic sectors, firm types and 
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localities. A more fine-grained and historically conscious perspective on the German 
training system reveals the political foundations on which the system rests, as well as 
ongoing tensions between the interests supporting ‘collectivist’ and ‘segmentalist’ alter-
natives to training – sometimes more, sometimes less intense (Thelen 2004: esp. chap-
ter 2). This suggests that, in order to make sense of the politics of training in Germany, 
and particularly of contemporary strains and trends in the system, it will be useful to 
keep the distinct logics of the two types of systems in mind. Segmentalist tendencies 
were explicitly suppressed at the turn of the last century, but the collectivist system that 
prevailed was held together not through a convergence in the preferences of different 
kinds of firms but rather through a political accommodation of these differences. In the 
meantime, increasing strains between different types of firms and within employers’ as-
sociations have reopened long-standing fissures, and the resulting strains are manifest 
in emerging segmentalist tendencies within the context of a formally still collectivist 
framework. 
We develop this argument in three steps. We begin by sketching out the contours of the 
two logics of training regimes, and hint at the way they are complemented and sup-
ported by different industrial relations and labour market arrangements. We then turn 
to observable trends – quantitative and qualitative – that signal new segmentalist ‘urges’ 
and demands, especially on the part of large firms. In particular, we reveal data on the 
declining participation rates of firms in training and on the rise of the so-called ‘transi-
tion system’ (Baethge et al. 2007) – a cobbled-together system of training measures im-
plemented by the state to compensate for the shortfall in training places. Subsequently, 
we present case studies and examples from the involvement of social partners in train-
ing reform to demonstrate the increasing contentiousness of these formerly consensual 
political processes – a fact which we take as an indication of particularistic interests 
gaining predominance over collective interests. A final section suggests how the trends 
that we observe in vocational training are connected to developments in other areas of 
the German political economy.
2 The German skill regime in comparative and historical perspective
In the varieties of capitalism literature, liberal market economies are characterized by 
market coordination and generate switchable assets (including ‘general’ or portable skills), 
while coordinated market economies feature strategic coordination in the production 
of dedicated assets (including ‘specific’ skills, either firm-specific or industry-specific; 
Hall/Soskice 2001; Iversen 2005). This is a powerful distinction, but by dichotomizing 
between liberal market economies and coordinated market economies it downplays the 
significant variation in training regimes in coordinated market economies (Anderson/
Hassel 2007; Estevez-Abe et al. 2001), as well as variation in institutional arrangements 
within a given economy (Culpepper 2003; Herrmann 2008; Becker 2007).
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In previous work, we have shown that coordinated skill regimes can represent two quite 
different solutions to the collective action problems that afflict private sector train-
ing regimes – yielding in effect two very different types of coordination: what we have 
referred to as ‘collectivist’ versus ‘segmentalist’ solutions (Thelen 2004; Thelen/Kume 
1999). The differences are important for various reasons, inter alia, because they are 
associated empirically with very different forms of union organization and associated 
degrees of labour strength, and therefore different distributional outcomes. Collectivist 
training regimes based on the production of occupational skills require much more en-
compassing organization and coordination on both the employer and labour sides than 
segmentalist systems based more on the production of company-specific skills. 
For our purposes, three features set collectivist systems clearly apart from more seg-
mentalist alternatives (see also the discussion in Thelen 2005, 2007). One is the over-
all higher levels of firm participation in training in collectivist systems. Whereas, in a 
segmentalist system like Japan, training is mostly undertaken by large firms for their 
own recruitment and retention purposes, collectivist systems typically train ‘above need’ 
and rely on the participation of a wider range of firms, including small and medium-
sized enterprises. Second, occupational labour markets feature more prominently in 
collectivist training regimes, whereas internal labour markets are more important in 
segmentalist systems. Third, and related to this, firm-based training in collectivist sys-
tems is subject to monitoring and oversight to ensure a degree of standardization in 
the content and quality of skills – something that is wholly absent from the alternative 
segmentalist model.
These features, in turn, are associated with somewhat different political patterns and 
dynamics. One facet of this has to do with the relative power of labour. Unions in seg-
mentalist systems certainly command some power vis-à-vis management, based on 
their indispensable cooperation in production and in the context of workers’ ‘stake-
holder’ position in the firm. However, union power in collectivist systems is further 
augmented by an overall broader skill base and especially by the exit options that skilled 
workers enjoy as a result of skill certification (Kume 1998; see also Streeck 1996: 144–51 
for an extended discussion).1 Different patterns of relations between labour and man-
agement and among firms flow from this. Thus, segmentalist regimes put a premium 
on social partnership at the company level (i.e., strong cooperation between workers 
and employers within the company) and require some coordination, albeit primarily 
among the large training firms, above all to avoid outbidding each other for entry-level 
workers.2 Collectivist skill regimes, by contrast, rely on social partnership at industry 
or national level, which facilitates strong coordination across all employers drawing 
1 This is not to say that collectivist systems were the product of labour strength, while segmental-
ist systems were the product of labour weakness (see Thelen 2004 for an extended argument to 
the contrary). 
2 There would also be coordination between core firms and their suppliers, since their production 
systems would be tightly integrated.
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on the same pool of occupational skills – not only wage coordination to keep poaching 
in check but also coordination in the definition and certification of skills. Collectivist 
skill regimes therefore have also always relied more heavily than segmentalist systems 
on some degree of state sponsorship – to shore up coordination, to underwrite enforce-
ment of collectively defined standards (even if these are set by the social partners), and 
to support (and often subsidize) the provision of portable skills (e.g. often through a 
school-based component to complement firm-based training).
In previous work, we have tracked the genesis and evolution of the German training 
system, including the politics and the processes through which a collectivist system 
prevailed historically over the segmentalist alternative (which was very viable at the 
turn of the century, see Thelen 2004: chapter 2). This history was marked much less by 
conflicts between labour and capital than it was shaped by conflicting interests among 
employers. Large ‘autarkic’ firms sought to tailor their training to fit with the internal 
labour markets they were cultivating as a means to keep unions at bay.3 By contrast, 
skill-intensive small and medium-sized firms in the industrieller Mittelstand (especially 
the machine industry) that were not able to sustain internal labour markets sought 
(and actually established, on a voluntary basis) a more genuinely solidaristic system of 
skill formation premised on labour mobility and skill standardization across firms. The 
tensions between these two alternative models (segmentalist versus collectivist) were a 
source of ongoing tension throughout the Weimar period and were in fact quelled only 
when the full power of the National Socialist state was brought to bear to suppress the 
labour movement altogether and to impose and diffuse a model of skill standardization 
and certification that had been pioneered by small and medium-sized enterprises on a 
voluntary basis. As we will see below, these tensions have resurfaced in the contempo-
rary period, and the ensuing struggles – both among employers and with labour – are 
what have been driving trends towards segmentalism.
3 Institutional change in German vocational training
The German version of a collectivist skill regime as it emerged in the decades after the 
Second World War has three main characteristics. First, a large share of firms partici-
pates in vocational training and, as a consequence, a large share of the youth population 
in a given age cohort opts for vocational training (mostly in the dual apprenticeship 
training regime) in preference to a general or academic education. As firms are engaged 
in training above and beyond their immediate needs, graduate apprentices can and do 
move between firms via occupational labour markets. Second, the content of in-plant 
apprenticeship training is strictly regulated in the form of nationally defined occupa-
3 Handicraft firms were similarly anti-union but more interested in apprenticeship training for 
the extra hand this provided in production than for later retention.
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tional profiles (Ausbildungsordnungen). Although there have always been differences 
between small and large firms in the implementation of these occupational profiles, 
semi-public bodies (the chambers of industry and commerce) and works councils ea-
gerly monitor the content and quality of training in order to ensure the comparability 
of vocational qualifications on the national labour market. Third, these occupational 
profiles are developed jointly by representatives of capital and labour in a neo-corpo-
ratist framework under the guidance of state actors. A cooperative climate prevails and 
the role of the state is relegated to that of a supportive arbiter.
Below, we will show that on all three fronts changes are underway that are likely to pull 
the German skill regime away from its collectivist heritage towards a more firm-centred 
and – as we call it – segmentalist variety. Of course, the fundamental pillars of the tradi-
tional collectivist system still remain intact to a significant extent. But what can be ob-
served are processes of incremental, yet transformative change (Streeck/Thelen 2005) 
that strengthen the segmentalist dimension of the German skill regime. For instance, 
the participation of firms in vocational training has been decreasing since the early 
1990s, resulting in a structural over-demand for apprenticeship places. Occupational 
profiles have been reformed in such a way as to allow more flexibility at the company 
level, resulting in less comparability above the level of the firm. Finally, the corporat-
ist process by which skill profiles are developed has become much more contentious, 
forcing state actors to abandon the position of neutral arbiter to become more actively 
involved. To illustrate the last two points, we present three case studies.
The decreasing involvement of firms in vocational training
One defining characteristic of the collectivist training system is the broad participation 
of firms in vocational training. Table 1 documents changes in the participation rate of 
firms in apprenticeship training for the period 1993 to 2006, which are further classi-
fied according to firm size and economic sector.4 Several observations stand out. First, 
the overall share of firms participating in apprenticeship training regardless of firm size 
and economic sector has decreased significantly from 35 per cent in 1993 to 26 per cent 
in 2006. Hence, the share of firms participating in training has decreased by more than 
a quarter (27 per cent) over a period of 13 years. 
Second, we observe well-known patterns in firm participation in training (cf. Neu-
bäumer/Bellmann 1999): the share of firms participating increases with firm size, and 
4 A note of caution in interpreting the numbers displayed in Table 1 is in order: unfortunately, the 
wording of the questions concerning firm participation in training in the IAB Establishment 
Panel changed several times during the period of observation. As a consequence, we observe 
conspicuous anomalies in the time series of firm participation rates. Therefore, the data in Ta-
ble 1 should be interpreted cautiously as a rough measure of broader trends.
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the average share of firms participating is higher in traditional manual occupations (in-
vestment and consumer goods, construction, agriculture, and mining) and traditional 
service occupations (secretaries, hotels and gastronomy, banking, public sector) than in 
new service occupations (social services, IT and media).
Third, and this is the point we want to highlight, the scale of decline in participa-
tion rates is related to firm size and the economic sector. The last column of Table 1 
shows the percentage change in participation rates between 1993 and 2006. Here, it can 
be seen that, across economic sectors, the overall decrease in training participation is 
mainly caused by small firms dropping out, whereas the share of larger firms participat-
ing has remained constant or even increased. The decline has been strongest for small 
firms in those economic sectors where dual apprenticeship training in manual occupa-
tions has a strong tradition (i.e., consumer and investment goods, construction, mining). 
In the service-oriented sectors of the economy, the decline has been significant as well, 
but less steep and starting from a lower level. In the traditional sectors, the participa-
tion rate for medium and large firms has stayed more or less constant but has increased 
significantly in the service-oriented sectors.5 The outcome of these movements is that 
5 These findings are in line with recent data provided in the Federal Report on Vocational Train-
ing (Berufsbildungsbericht, BMBF 2008: 17). The number of apprentices in service occupations 
has outnumbered those in manual occupations since the late 1990s despite the fact that, relative 
to employment, apprenticeship training is less prevalent in the service sector. 
Table 1 Percentage share of firms participating in apprenticeship training, grouped by firm size  
and economic sector, 1993–2006
Sector Firm size Year Change in %
1993 1996 1999 2002 2004 2006 1993–2006
Consumer and investment 
goods, construction, 
agriculture, mining 
(traditional manual 
occupations)
1–9 0.466 0.332 0.465 0.182 0.181 0.168  –64
10–49 0.669 0.570 0.762 0.394 0.407 0.401  –40
50–199 0.807 0.715 0.840 0.673 0.637 0.718  –7
200–499 0.848 0.790 0.914 0.820 0.890 0.873  +3
500 and above 0.945 0.949 0.975 0.926 0.937 0.869  –8
Secretarial work, hotels and 
gastronomy, public sector, 
banking (traditional service 
occupations)
1–9 0.182 0.115 0.386 0.138 0.115 0.132  –27
10–49 0.443 0.415 0.605 0.357 0.410 0.375  –15
50–199 0.644 0.575 0.730 0.707 0.711 0.701  +9
200–499 0.793 0.653 0.733 0.842 0.858 0.840  +6
500 and above 0.774 0.758 0.865 0.924 0.899 0.918  +19
New service sectors  
(social services, IT, media)
1–9 0.285 0.104 0.129 0.181 0.155 0.183  –36
10–49 0.340 0.160 0.252 0.374 0.339 0.315  –7
50–199 0.384 0.330 0.533 0.500 0.538 0.527  +37
200–499 0.445 0.428 0.614 0.659 0.745 0.647  +45
500 and above 0.851 0.494 0.810 0.838 0.860 0.844  –1
Total 0.353 0.254 0.461 0.262 0.258 0.258  –27
Source: IAB Establishment Panel, own calculations.
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differences in participation rates between economic sectors that existed in 1993 have 
become smaller over time (see Hartung/Schöngen 2007 for a similar argument), and 
that the centre of gravity of the system in terms of participation has shifted from small 
to medium and large firms. 
In addition to participation, the intensity of the training commitment is another way of 
gauging the involvement of firms. Table 2 shows data on training intensity, measured 
as the share of apprentices in total employment, categorized in turn according to firm 
size. The figures in brackets show apprentice ratios for firms that actually participate in 
training, whereas the non-bracketed figures are apprentice ratios for the training and 
non-training firms. Again, we see a decline in the total training intensity from 1993 to 
2006 (last row of Table 2), but it is less pronounced than in the case of participation 
rates (minus 8 per cent). Similarly, training intensity in small firms has declined more 
than in medium and large firms. This finding is a consequence of a significant number 
of small firms deciding to stop offering apprenticeship training in general. However, if 
we look at training firms only (figures in brackets), we see that the apprentice ratio has 
increased significantly in smaller firms (from 14.9 per cent in 1993 to 23.5 per cent in 
2006). This indicates a bifurcation in the training behaviour of small firms: some firms 
decide to drop out of training altogether, but those firms that continue to train and 
accept a significant amount of fixed costs employ relatively many apprentices. Without 
pursuing this issue further here, it could be suspected that the latter type of firm re-
places regular workers with apprentices. 
Summing up, we find evidence for a gradual decline of the involvement of firms in 
vocational training, both in terms of participation and in terms of training intensity. 
However, we find important differences in firm behaviour according to firm size and 
economic sector. Small firms in those sectors of the economy where apprenticeship 
training has traditionally been strong have dropped out disproportionately, but medi-
Table 2 Training intensity (measured in terms of the share of apprentices in total employment)
Firm size Year
 1993 1996 1999 2002 2004 2006
1–9  4.2
 (14.9)
 3.8
 (18.9)
 5.1
 (21.7)
 4.2
 (25.5)
 3.6
 (22.1)
 3.9
 (23.5)
10–49  5.6
 (10.8)
 5.5
 (11.5)
 5.8
 (12.4)
 5.4
 (13.3)
 5.4
 (13.7)
 4.9
 (12.3)
50–199  4.0
 (5.9)
 3.9
 (6.0)
 3.6
 (5.3)
 4.3
 (7.1)
 4.3
 (7.1)
 4.3
 (7.0)
200–499  3.7
 (4.8)
 4.2
 (5.5)
 3.2
 (4.1)
 3.8
 (5.0)
 3.8
 (4.7)
 3.7
 (4.7)
500 and above  3.9
 (4.6)
 4.6
 (3.8)
 3.2
 (3.5)
 4.1
 (4.7)
 4.2
 (4.8)
 4.0
 (4.6)
Total  4.5
 (12.6)
 4.2
 (14.4)
 5.1
 (16.3)
 4.5
 (17.2)
 4.0
 (15.5)
 4.1
 (15.7)
Figures in brackets are apprentice ratios for training firms only, 1993–2006. 
Source: IAB Establishment Panel, own calculations.
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um and large firms remain committed. Firms in the service-oriented sectors are engag-
ing in apprenticeship training slowly, but on a smaller scale than firms in the traditional 
sectors. 
What are the consequences of the changing training behaviour of firms? First, the de-
cline in the participation rate of firms has resulted in a structural excess demand for 
apprenticeship places on the part of young people. In former times, the German system 
was revered for the ease with which it facilitated the transition from school to training 
to employment (Allmendinger 1989; Soskice 1994). The excess demand for training 
places, however, has led to the rise of the so-called ‘transition system’ (Baethge et al. 
2007) – a patchwork system of training, education and labour market measures that is 
supposed to ease the transition between school and vocational training for those who 
are initially unsuccessful in finding an apprenticeship place.
To illustrate this point, Figure 1 shows data on the number of young people entering 
various routes of training, education and (un)employment. First of all, the continu-
ous increase in the number of school-leavers from less than 800,000 in 1992 to about 
950,000 in 2006 is striking. A significant part of this increasing demographic pressure 
has been channelled to the universities, as can be seen by the increasing number of 
first year students in Figure 1. This is an important difference to the period of the early 
1980s: this period witnessed a similar increase in the number of young school-leavers, 
Figure 1 Number of participants in various education alternatives, 1992–2006 
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but, at this time, vocational training, not the universities, absorbed most of the excess 
demand. Most of the academic observers of vocational training in the early 1980s at-
tribute this to the successful implementation of a quasi-corporatist deal between the 
federal government and the employers’ associations: the government would refrain 
from imposing too much regulation on firm-based training in exchange for the firms’ 
commitment to expanding training places (Baethge 1999; Casey 1991). In the second 
half of the 1990s, however, the onset of a similar demand crisis did not trigger a similar 
expansion of training places, hinting at important shifts in the underlying logic of the 
system. In fact, Figure 1 shows that the number of new apprenticeship contracts hovers 
around 600,000 for the whole period from 1992 to 2006, i.e., the number of training 
places offered is independent of changes on the demand side indicated by the increasing 
number of school-leavers.
Where did young people unable to secure an apprenticeship end up? Fortunately, the 
number of unemployed persons below the age of 20 seems to have stayed constant since 
the early 1990s (see Figure 1). Some people have opted for school-based vocational 
training instead of firm-based apprenticeship training (plus 85 per cent from 1992 to 
2006). This need not be a bad alternative, given that some of the occupations tradition-
ally being taught in vocational schools (i.e., social services) are increasingly demanded 
on the labour market. However, those types of school-based vocational training that do 
not lead to full vocational qualifications and are therefore a genuine part of the transi-
tion system are much more prevalent in terms of participants and have increased simi-
larly to fully qualifying school-based training: from about 200,000 in 1992 to 378,000 in 
2006 (plus 86 per cent). Furthermore, training and qualification measures financed by 
the Federal Employment Agency (BA), so-called berufsvorbereitende Bildungsmaßnah-
men (BvB), have increased by a staggering 174 per cent from 70,000 in 1992 to 192,000 
in 2006. Again, these measures do not directly lead to vocational degrees, or other cer-
tifications with labour market relevance.
In addition to increasing problems in the transition from school to training, the transi-
tion from training to employment is becoming less smooth. As we have argued above, 
occupational labour markets are an important defining characteristic of collectivist 
training regimes. Firms (mostly smaller ones) relying on these external labour markets 
for skilled workers have a common interest in standardized occupational profiles. Oc-
cupational labour markets also ensure that apprentices who are not retained by their 
training firms can find qualified employment in another firm. In Germany in the past, 
craft firms committed to apprenticeship traditions often trained ‘above need’ and played 
an important stabilizing role in times of economic downturn. In the so-called ‘dual sec-
tor model’ (Neubäumer 1999; Neubäumer/Bellmann 1999; Soskice 1994), graduate ap-
prentices from the crafts sector would then often move on to semi-skilled employment 
in the industrial or service sector. In recent years, there are strong indications that this 
dual sector model is not working as smoothly as before, because the skill demands of 
industrial firms are becoming more specific and semi-skilled positions for which craft-
trained apprentices usually qualified have been outsourced or rationalized (Jaudas et 
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al. 2004). This change in the training behaviour of firms has also had significant conse-
quences for the politics of reforming occupational profiles.
The changing politics of vocational training reform
So far, we have approached the issue of institutional change in German vocational train-
ing from the perspective of individual economic actors (firms and [prospective] ap-
prentices respectively). However, associations, i.e., employers’ associations and unions, 
play an important role as well (Greinert 1998; Streeck et al. 1987; Hilbert et al. 1990) 
because they represent the collective dimension of vocational training. At the com-
pany level, representatives of business and labour (chambers and works councils) are 
in charge of monitoring the implementation of occupational profiles. At the industrial 
and macro level, associations are involved in the process of both devising new and re-
forming old occupational profiles (Ausbildungsordnungen). In addition, they lobby for 
or against modifications in the general institutional framework as defined, inter alia, by 
the Vocational Education and Training Act (BBiG). Below, we will focus on the continu-
ous process of revising and updating occupational profiles, because this is where we 
can best observe processes of incremental institutional change that are most relevant to 
associations. 
The process of (re)defining particular occupational skills generally plays out between 
two different poles: on the one hand, unions (sometimes in coalition with craft firms) 
lobby for broad skill profiles with ‘labour market relevance’. Unions also tend to favour 
unitary skill profiles, where the training period is the same for every apprentice in a 
given occupation as is the type of qualification awarded at the end of the training pe-
riod. From a union perspective, common standards prevent a differentiation of occu-
pational profiles that would increase conflict between workers over wage levels, which 
would in turn interfere with the smooth functioning of the collective wage bargaining 
system. On the other hand, employers, and especially large employers who expect to 
retain most of their apprentices, aim to develop more specific skill profiles in order to 
address their own specific skill needs. They also have a preference for a higher degree of 
differentiation within and between occupational profiles because they can concentrate 
costly training measures on more able apprentices, while saving on the training of the 
less talented. In addition, the introduction of several levels of vocational training allows 
for more differentiated wage arrangements, reflecting differences in productivity more 
accurately and weakening the collective voice of employees in wage bargaining. 
There are several neuralgic points during the process of training reform where these 
conflicts of interest materialize: decisions about the general scope and breadth of the 
occupational profile in question, the actual content to be included in the legally binding 
description of the profile and, related to this, the degree of ‘concreteness’ with which 
this content is described, as well as the way the final exams are organized. In the 1970s 
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and 1980s, occupational profiles usually were monolithic (Monoberufe) in the sense 
that they offered little room for firms or apprentices to choose different specializations. 
In addition, the system was undifferentiated to the extent that almost all vocational 
qualifications awarded the same status of skilled worker. Standardization of exams was 
achieved by relying on standardized test material developed by organizations such as 
the PAL (Prüfungsaufgaben- und Lehrmittelentwicklungsstelle) and the close involve-
ment of chambers of industry and commerce in administering the exams. 
As we will argue below, the system has changed considerably since then. The trend that 
we call segmentalism manifests itself in the growing importance of firm-level interests 
to the detriment of collective interests. In the present case, this has two major compo-
nents: first, the structure of occupational profiles is reformed in such a way as to allow 
for more flexibility in the implementation of occupational profiles at the level of the 
firm; second, the politics of designing and reforming occupational profiles is becoming 
more contentious, with actors defining and asserting their interests in a more particu-
laristic, less cooperative way. 
This argument will be fleshed out in greater detail by looking at three case studies of 
aspects of the current reform debates: first, the dispute over modularization, flexibiliza-
tion and Europeanization of vocational training; second, the (re)introduction of two-
year apprenticeships; and, third, the unfolding conflict over vocational exams. We will 
try to avoid repetition, although the chosen examples are obviously particular facets of 
a more comprehensive debate. In addition to primary and secondary sources, we draw 
from a pool of more than 20 interviews with representatives of unions, employers’ as-
sociations and state actors conducted during the years 2006 to 2008.
Modularization, flexibilization and Europeanization of vocational training
One way to achieve more flexibility in the implementation of training ordinances (Aus-
bildungsverordnungen) is to increase the options for specialization within a given oc-
cupational profile. Large firms benefit overproportionally from this because they have 
more need for specialized workers within the same occupation, and they have the nec-
essary training capacities to be able to offer these specialized profiles. Small firms will 
not be able to offer the same range of specializations as large firms, although they might 
benefit if they have special skill needs. But when they are dependent on occupational 
labour markets or workers with broader skills (as is often the case for firms in the crafts 
sector), they benefit less. Too much specialization might also hurt workers’ interests in 
labour market relevance and transferability of vocational skills. The concept of modu-
larization captures the idea of content-wise flexibilization: instead of monolithic oc-
cupational profiles, vocational training is broken down into smaller building blocks 
(‘modules’), from which firms and/or apprentices can ‘pick and choose’. 
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The debate on modularization had already flared up in the mid 1990s (Kloas 1997). As 
could be expected, unions were opposed to the idea of modularization because they 
feared a subordination of training needs to the economic needs of firms (Bundesregie-
rung 1997: 22). The Christian democratic federal government in principle recognized 
the firms’ call for more flexibility and differentiation, but refrained from intervening 
more actively in the realm of vocational training reform, respecting the autonomy of 
the social partners by merely prompting them to speed up the whole process (Bundes-
regierung 1996: 2). The social partners remained committed to the consensus principle, 
and therefore the emerging compromise between the needs of firms for more special-
ization and the concerns of unions for skills with labour market relevance led to the cre-
ation of demanding occupational profiles that combined the provision of broad or core 
skills during the first years of apprenticeship with limited options for specialization 
later on (Baethge 2003: 577). This flexibilization proceeded without a master plan on 
a case-by-case basis, resulting in numerous types of specialization within occupational 
profiles (for an overview of which, see KWB 2006), although the reform of occupations 
in the metal and electrical industries and the enactment of new profiles in the IT sec-
tor in the late 1990s served as role models (Baethge 2003: 577–578). In particular, the 
recent reform of metal and electrical occupations set new standards by systematically 
incorporating vocational training into real-life work processes within the firm (‘process 
orientation’), instead of sticking to standards handed down without any close connec-
tion to actual working life in the firm context (Gesamtmetall 2005; Interview ST-3)6.
These kinds of compromise staved off calls for further modularization for some time. 
But in recent times there have been clear indications of change. In 2005, the Federal 
Vocational Training Act (BBiG) was reformed, expanding opportunities for differen-
tiation by allowing firms to provide additional qualifications (Zusatzqualifikationen) 
(i.e., above and beyond the minimum requirements for apprentices within the general 
framework). At the same time, the debate on modularization has gained further mo-
mentum from the ‘Europeanization’ of vocational education and training (VET) policy. 
Europeanization has opened up a window of opportunity for the reform of the national 
training regime (Trampusch 2006; Martens/Wolf 2006), with employers and the fed-
eral government mostly keen on exploiting this opportunity for significant reform and 
unions largely on the defensive. 
The linking element between Europeanization and the modularization of training is the 
question of how to render educational qualifications comparable across national sys-
tems. In order to be able to make the qualifications obtained comparable across coun-
tries, a common framework – the European Qualifications Framework (EQF) and the 
European Credit System for Vocational Education and Training (ECVET) – needs to be 
developed, and credit units in national training regulations have to be defined in such 
6 At the request of our interview partners, references to individual interviews have been ano-
nymized. The denotation “UN” indicates an interviewee from trade unions, “EMP” stands for 
employers, and “ST” for state actors.
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a way that it is clear how much credit an apprentice must be given for the parts of his 
or her training obtained in another country. By breaking integrated occupations down 
into their component skill modules, modularization facilitates such comparisons. 
For unions, the crucial question is whether modularization refers to the process of skill 
acquisition (which would be consistent with the survival of a model based on occupa-
tional skills) or to a deconstruction of the skill profile itself (which would not). For this 
reason, unions are divided on the issue. A very critical union study (Drexel 2005) feared 
the wholesale elimination of the dual system in its current form, while the mainstream 
position in unions is guarded – one of critical support or supportive criticism, as they 
put it (Kuda/Strauß 2006; Ehrke 2006). 
Employers and especially the federal government are more supportive (Küssner/Seng 
2006; Brunner et al. 2006). Despite some disagreement over detail, German compa-
nies welcome and support the process of Europeanization of VET, though employers 
are also careful to reiterate their commitment to the ‘occupational principle’ (Berufs-
prinzip) (Brunner et al. 2006: 15–16) – a symbolic codeword for the commitment to 
training based on integrated occupational profiles and national recognition, instead of 
‘atomistic’ on-the-job training. 
Perhaps more important for our argument is to note differences in the positions ad-
opted by different employer associations, each associated with different segments of 
capital. The most radical proposals come from the Bundesvereinigung der deutschen 
Arbeitgeberverbände (BDA), which is skewed towards the interests of large industrial 
firms, and call for a full-scale deconstruction or reformulation of current training reg-
ulations in the form of modules (Ausbildungsbausteine) (BDA 2006). The BDA also 
proposes a new structure for occupational profiles, where two-year apprenticeships 
focusing on basic qualifications become the default and further qualifications can be 
added through continuous training or the continuation of training in a three-year ap-
prenticeship (‘2 plus x’) (BDA 2007: II). Furthermore, the BDA proposals advocate the 
institutionalization of firm-level ‘pacts for vocational training’, mirroring the creation 
of firm-level ‘pacts for employment’ (BDA 2006: 5). These pacts for vocational training 
are aimed at lowering apprenticeship wages, which are usually set by collective wage 
bargaining, even for firms that are not covered by collective wage agreements, on a firm-
by-firm basis. 
The association representing artisanal firms, the Zentralverband des deutschen Handwerks 
(ZDH), by contrast, is more critical of full-scale modularization (Interview EMP-2). 
The ZDH is also in favour of flexibilizing the system of occupational profiles, but this 
should be done, it believes, within the confines of regular training reforms, and the ho-
listic ‘identity’ of occupations must be preserved. Furthermore, the partial provision of 
vocational qualifications must be avoided, and the comparability of vocational degrees 
above the firm level (Überbetrieblichkeit) should be maintained (Interview EMP-14).
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Finally, the Deutscher Industrie- und Handelskammertag (DIHK), the national orga-
nization of the chambers for industry and commerce, occupies a middle position by 
proposing to flexibilize the dual training system without abandoning the ‘occupational 
principle’ and committing to full-scale modularization (DIHK 2007). Because of its 
broad organizational base, and especially because of the central role it plays in the ad-
ministration of the dual system, the DIHK is deeply committed to maintaining the rel-
evance and integrity of the current system of training. Since vocational education and 
training is the ‘most important pillar’ in the foundation of local chambers (Interview 
EMP-3), it is therefore an important source of power for the chambers. 
Representatives of the federal government have expressed the most enthusiasm, and 
some of them appear to view Europeanization as a window of opportunity to push for 
a more general reform of the system (Trampusch 2006). In addition, German policy-
makers now seem to have decided to lead the pack on vocational training reform at the 
EU level instead of obstructing it (as was the case before due to the idiosyncratic nature 
of the German system in a Europe dominated by systems based on school-based voca-
tional training) (Interview ST-1). Hence, the federal government fully supports modu-
larization and flexibilization (Schavan 2006: 3). The current federal education minis-
ter, Annette Schavan (CDU), set up an ‘innovation circle’ on vocational education and 
training, composed of union and employer representatives, together with ‘independent’ 
scientists, thus attenuating the voting and opinion power of potentially ‘obstructionist’ 
parties. The basis for discussions was a policy paper commissioned by the ministry that 
emphasized the need for modularization and in effect proposed only two alternatives of 
more or less radical modularization (Euler/Severing 2006). 
In the end, the ‘innovation circle’ did not go so far as to propose a full-scale modu-
larization, but it recommended the development of training modules for 10 to 12 of 
the most common occupations in order to help young people who failed before to 
get access to training (Innovationskreis 2007: 6). These proposals are a continuation 
of previous developments in which the issue of modularization and flexibilization is 
touted as a means to solve the problem of structural excess demand for training places. 
Before the 2005 reform, a smaller reform of the BBiG in conjunction with the Hartz 
reforms of labour market policies introduced the concept of qualification modules 
(Qualifizierungsbausteine). These earlier modules, however, are not full-grown mod-
ules because they are only loosely related to the content of occupational profiles. The 
new type of modularization as proposed by the ‘innovation circle’ goes one step further 
because occupational profiles themselves are broken down into modules. Furthermore, 
modules can be provided in various places of learning (firms, training centres, etc.) 
and, most importantly, firms can opt to provide only parts of vocational training (i.e., 
individual modules). This is clearly the fact that fuels union opposition to modulariza-
tion because it would open up opportunities for firms to train according to short-term 
needs instead of having to subscribe to three or more years of apprenticeship training 
(IG Metall 2007). However, opposition to modularization is hard to maintain when this 
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has been successfully linked to debates on Europeanization and solving the plight of 
unsuccessful training applicants. 
Two-year apprenticeships
Besides the content of occupational profiles, the prescribed length of apprenticeship 
training is another starting point for reform discussions. Traditionally, most training 
occupations in Germany last for three or three and a half years, leading to the full voca-
tional qualification of a skilled worker or craftsman (Facharbeiter in industry and Ge-
selle in the crafts sector). In the 1970s, business and labour decided to introduce ‘staged’ 
or step-by-step training (Stufenausbildung) in the metal and electrical occupations (IG 
Metall 1991[1977]). Here, a number of less demanding two-year apprenticeships were 
put alongside more demanding, longer apprenticeships. An apprentice could complete 
the first stage after two years of apprenticeship, but would achieve the full credentials 
for a skilled worker’s qualification only after the second stage and at least another year 
of training was completed. Initially, unions believed a staged apprenticeship would 
strengthen the provision of broad, basic skills in the first stage of the apprenticeship 
and ensure that apprentices who failed in the more demanding occupations could leave 
training with at least some type of vocational certificate. However, IG Metall and other 
unions soon realized that, in practice, this concept increased the power of employers, 
because progressing to the second stage of training did not depend so much on the ap-
prentices’ choice but on the training firms’ willingness to offer suitable training places 
(Hilbert et al. 1990: 85–86; Streeck et al. 1987: 78; IG Metall 1991[1977]: 418–419). 
As a consequence of this development, unions pushed successfully for the abolition of 
staged apprenticeships during the reforms of the metal and electrical occupations in 
the 1980s. Firms’ options were thus limited to the choice between training somebody 
for three and a half years, awarding them the status of ‘skilled worker’ and paying them 
accordingly, on the one hand, or not training them at all, on the other. At the same 
time, a number of two-year occupational profiles ‘survived’, but – probably because of 
the strength of labour at the firm level – the number of apprentices in these remain-
ing two-year apprenticeships declined continuously (Zedler 1995; Stooß 1997). In the 
construction sector and partly in the service sector (e.g. regarding the occupation of 
‘shop clerk’), two-year apprenticeships have remained common across the whole period 
without causing too much friction.
Parallel to its attempts to flexibilize vocational training content-wise, the Christian dem-
ocratic government repeatedly advocated the idea of ‘differentiating’ the apprenticeship 
system by reintroducing different types of apprenticeships, based on different lengths 
of training, during the 1980s and 1990s (see, for example, Bundesregierung 1985: 16). 
However, after the negative experiences of unions with staged apprenticeships and the 
continued commitment of the social partners to the consensus principle, the unions’ 
veto against two-year apprenticeships was effective and prevented differentiation until 
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2003, when the federal government decided to break with the consensus principle and 
intervene directly in the process of training reform.
The prelude to this dramatic climax was a serious deterioration on the apprenticeship 
market after the burst of the new economy bubble. The red–green government was 
keen on reducing youth unemployment and solving the demand crises on the training 
market, having already enacted a large, but short-term oriented programme to bring 
young people into employment and training in 1998 (called JUMP). Encouraged by 
pertinent research findings (Vogler-Ludwig et al. 2003), the government hoped that the 
(re)introduction of two-year apprenticeships would help solve the demand crisis. 
At the same time, business became more assertive in stating its need for more differ-
entiation in the vocational training system. Trammelled by intensifying cost pressures, 
business was keen to increase the flexibility of the hitherto undifferentiated and often 
unyielding training system (KWB 1999, 2006; BDA 2006, 2007). Changes in the orga-
nization of production and technical upgrading also contributed to a redefinition of 
skill demands. One often cited example is the work at assembly lines in large automo-
bile firms (Lacher 2007; Zeller 2007). In the 1980s, large firms would recruit gradu-
ate apprentices from the crafts sector for this kind of semi-skilled or unskilled work 
(Neubäumer 1999; Neubäumer/Bellmann 1999; Soskice 1994). But, increasingly, skill 
demands for semi-skilled labour have increased and become more specialized, so that 
firms prefer to train their own people for these kinds of jobs (but for shorter periods 
of time) instead of relying on external occupational labour markets and then having to 
engage in retraining (which is also the finding of a survey of 1400 firms conducted by 
Bellaire et al. 2006; Interview EMP-1, EMP-2, EMP-4).
Unions continued to be adamantly opposed to the reintroduction of two-year appren-
ticeships (DGB 2003, 2006; IG Metall 2007) because they suspected a motivation of stra-
tegic downgrading of skills with negative feedback effects on collective wage bargain-
ing. The shock was therefore great when the Minister for Economic Affairs, Wolfgang 
Clement, a member of the sympathetic social democratic party, sided with employers 
in 2003 and decided against the will of the unions to reintroduce two-year apprentice-
ships. With this act, the tradition of the consensus principle was broken, leading to bit-
ter conflicts between unions and employers over the issue of two-year apprenticeships. 
Since then, IG Metall and ver.di have refused to participate in the process of reform-
ing occupational profiles as far as two-year apprenticeships are concerned (Interview 
EMP-8). However, more and more two-year apprenticeships have been introduced since 
2003. Employers are pushing a model where less demanding, two-year apprenticeships 
are developed alongside more demanding, longer apprenticeships, and qualifications 
gained in the shorter apprenticeship are fully taken into account when continuing into 
a longer apprenticeship. Hence, firms can hire apprentices in the shorter apprenticeship 
first and then decide later on whether they want to offer the apprentice the longer, more 
demanding type of training (KWB 2006; BDA 2007).
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In sum, the example of two-year apprenticeships shows that the political process of 
reforming occupational profiles has become more contentious. Again, the cleavage be-
tween business and labour is just one cleavage line that is opening up. Although the het-
erogeneity of interests has always been significant, additional conflicts are materializing 
within the employers’ camp. First, representatives of the craft sector with a traditionally 
strong attachment to apprenticeship training (Streeck 1992: 108ff.) are sceptical about 
two-year apprenticeships because they could endanger the important social integration 
of the apprentice into the firm. Additionally, the apprentices’ contribution to the on-
going production process is more important for small crafts firms that in turn depend 
on the more productive, but still inexpensive contribution of the apprentice in the third 
year of training. Second, industrial firms, in particular large ones, have a growing need 
for their own, more specific training occupations for semi-skilled positions. Also, they 
are increasingly reluctant and/or unwilling to ‘overinvest’ in training (i.e., train skilled 
workers that are supposed to fill semi-skilled positions later on) due to increasing cost 
pressures and the continued power of works councils to make firms retain apprentices 
after training (Interview EMP-9, EMP-13). 
Examinations
Besides the reintroduction of two-year apprenticeships and the increased leeway for 
firm-specific training by flexibilizing the regulations of training ordinances, some busi-
ness interests are lobbying for a reconsideration of the way exams are organized. In 
the classical collectivist training regime of Germany, the organization of exams was an 
important mechanism to bring the different interests together. For each occupation, 
there is a special examination committee within the local chamber, consisting of repre-
sentatives of business and labour (as well as, with minor involvement, teachers of local 
vocational schools). Most importantly, participation on the committees is voluntary 
and non-paid. The underlying collectivist dimension in this arrangement is that, for 
obvious practical reasons, large firms can send more of their employees as ‘volunteers’ 
than small firms. Often, these persons are specialists in vocational training (e.g. trainers 
or human resource personnel), ensuring that the quality of exams is high. Large firms 
also have an interest in maintaining the quality of apprenticeship training in their re-
gion if they are reliant on occupational labour markets to fill semi-skilled and unskilled 
positions. 
Nowadays, this collectivist arrangement is increasingly being challenged on a number 
of fronts. First, large firms are more and more reluctant to second their (paid) em-
ployees to act as (unpaid) ‘volunteers’ on examination committees (Interview EMP-9). 
Second, and probably more importantly, some firms are becoming unsatisfied with the 
way exams are organized and what subject matter is examined. As discussed above in 
the case of metal and electrical occupations, firms and business associations are striving 
for a closer match between the organization and content of vocational training and real 
work processes within the firm. Instead of having their apprentices perform tasks that 
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are only loosely related to the firms’ activities – just because they are required by the 
training ordinance – firms would rather have their apprentices learn to participate and 
think in terms of the real processes at work within that specific firm (‘process orienta-
tion’) (Interview ST-3, EMP-4). Consequently, they believe that exams should test the 
ability of apprentices to cope with real world problems (‘process competence’), which 
can be best achieved by shifting the prime responsibility for exams from the chamber-
based examination committees to the firms themselves (Interview EMP-9). Related to 
this, the firm-level administration of exams is also part of the more far-reaching pro-
posals for modularization (Euler/Severing 2006).
Thus, the issue of exams has opened up rifts in the employers’ camp. Industrial firms, 
particularly medium to large ones with the necessary capacities to organize firm-based 
exams and more specific skill demands, are increasingly challenging the monopoly of 
chambers in organizing exams (Interview EMP-9, EMP-3). It is recognized that holding 
exams at the firm level instead of chambers would probably reduce the comparability 
of vocational qualifications, as training becomes less standardized and more tailored 
towards firm-specific needs. But this is not seen as a huge problem because work expe-
rience and the benefits of more flexible training outweigh the disadvantages (Interview 
ST-3, EMP-10).
The chambers, in contrast, are defending the traditional system, since vocational train-
ing, and the organization of exams and awarding of certificates in particular, is a signifi-
cant part of their raison d’être (Interview EMP-3). The crafts sector is also a defender of 
the traditional system, partly because the crafts chambers are in a similar situation as 
the chambers of commerce,7 but also because the average firm size in the crafts sector 
is much smaller and firms depend on the participation of larger firms on the examina-
tion committees. Furthermore, as a consequence of their smaller size, craft firms rely 
on occupational labour markets to a greater extent than large industrial firms and there-
fore have a greater need for more standardized vocational degrees. Noting a change in 
the associational climate, representatives of the crafts sector link the continued viabil-
ity of the collectivist, chamber-based arrangement to notions of ‘solidarity’ (Interview 
EMP-14).
Tentative conclusions
Summing up, the three examples of modularization, two-year apprenticeships and 
exam reorganization have shown that the German vocational training system is under-
7 Interest representation in the crafts sector is somewhat bifurcated: on the one hand, crafts cham-
bers (Handwerkskammern) are public law bodies with extensive responsibilities in the realm of 
vocational training, in particular in organizing the exams and awarding certificates. On the 
other hand, Innungen are voluntary associations representing the interests of a specific trade. At 
the federal level, however, there is a de facto personal union in interest representation between 
the two (Streeck 1992: 108ff.).
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going a period of significant change. Disputes between business and labour are increas-
ing, blemishing cherished consensual traditions, although cooperation between the so-
cial partners in training reform is still common practice in a lot of cases. What is more, 
conflicts within the employers’ camp are increasing as well, being associated with and 
resulting in a weakening of the collectivist dimension of the traditional system to the 
benefit of more particularistic interests. In addition, the role of the government in the 
politics of training reform has considerably changed from that of ‘neutral broker and 
facilitator’ between business and labour (Hilbert et al. 1990) to that of a more actively 
involved initiator and reformer. This may be related to a broader trend of reform-mind-
ed assertiveness on the part of government, but we claim it is also a consequence of the 
deterioration of collectivism in favour of segmentalism: formerly successful arrange-
ments of private interest government (Streeck/Schmitter 1985) are increasingly being 
challenged by endogenous forces, and the state has to step in to mediate and resolve 
disputes (about which, see Streeck 2009 for a related argument). To buttress our argu-
ment, we will discuss in the next section how institutional change in vocational training 
is related to parallel processes of change unfolding in other domains of the German 
political economy.
4 Conclusions
In sum, developments over the past two decades point to a subtle but significant shift in 
the German vocational training system, towards enhanced segmentalism and dualism. 
These changes have come about not so much through noisy clashes between opposing 
parties over diametrically opposed reform concepts, but rather through more incre-
mental changes and ongoing political manoeuvring in which all of the relevant actors 
have tried to sell their preferred models as a way of shoring up (not dismantling) the 
traditional model, by ‘reforming’ outdated training ordinances and adapting them to a 
new market context. In this sense, recent developments in German vocational training 
provide a vivid illustration of the kind of processes – incremental but with the potential 
to be cumulatively transformative – that are characteristic of contemporary political 
economic reforms generally (Streeck/Thelen 2005).
Our main objective in this article has been to draw attention to the two very differ-
ent logics of skill formation that are subsumed (and often obscured) within the broad 
category of ‘coordinated market economy’, to document the historically rooted tension 
between the two and to chronicle the recent reassertion in Germany of new (or, from a 
more historical perspective, renewed) segmentalist tendencies. While a full explication 
of the political dynamics behind this shift lies beyond the scope of this article, we see 
these developments as congruent with (and causally connected to) broader trends in 
the German political economy. 
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For example, the trend towards segmentalism in training that we have documented here 
parallels very closely developments in industrial relations and labour market policies. 
In the German case, there is now a considerable literature that documents transforma-
tional shifts in collective wage bargaining, labour relations, the welfare state and labour 
market institutions that have happened over the last years (for an overview, see Streeck 
2009; Kitschelt/Streeck 2004). Tracing the process of how institutional complementa-
rities between industrial relations, labour market institutions and vocational training 
unfold over time is an important issue for future research. For the present purpose, we 
merely would like to point out three intriguing parallel developments in industrial rela-
tions and vocational training. 
First, the declining membership base of intermediary associations is mirrored in the 
retreat of segments of business from participating in vocational training. We have seen 
that there are significant differences related to firm size and economic sector in regard 
to the decline in training intensity and participation rates. Medium and large firms in 
the ‘core’ of the export-oriented German economy remain committed to vocational 
training (see also Walden/Herget 2002). These types of firms also value the benefits 
of collective wage bargaining (Hassel/Rehder 2001; Thelen/Van Wijnbergen 2003), i.e., 
social peace and a cooperative stance on the part of workers. However, as Silvia and 
Schroeder (2007) have argued, large firms relay cost pressures from global export mar-
kets to their small-firm suppliers. These in turn are increasingly unable or unwilling 
to accept the high levels of wages set by large-firm dominated employers’ associations 
(Thelen/Van Wijnbergen 2003) and relinquish their membership. 
In vocational training, a similar process might be at work. Large-firm dominated indus-
trial and employers’ associations are the de facto representatives of business during the 
process of training reform. For the most part, they still value the consensus principle 
(with the exception of two-year apprenticeships) because a successful implementation 
of training ordinances requires the cooperation of labour. With employers striving for 
specialization and unions for broad and high-skill occupational profiles, the eventual 
cumulative outcomes are ever more demanding training profiles, which overcharge the 
training capacities of small firms, enticing them to drop out of training altogether. 
Additionally, the declining membership base of intermediary associations simply means 
that it will be harder to acquire additional apprenticeship places. During the ‘golden age 
of vocational training’ in the early 1980s, the prospect of helping out ‘their’ (conser-
vative) government might have been a strong enough normative and moral incentive. 
At least, there was a detectable upwards spike in the supply of training places. Similar 
efforts on the part of chambers, Länder governments, associations and other civil so-
ciety organizations (e.g. churches) for an increase in training places during the recent 
demand crisis have not been equally successful (Interview EMP-7). Without reading 
too much into scant evidence, it seems that collective or normative obligations as mo-
tivations to train ‘above need’ are being replaced by more firm-centred or segmentalist 
motivations to train when there is a concrete need. 
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Second, the erosion and decentralization of collective wage bargaining is related to the 
strengthening of firm-specific components in vocational training. In the 1980s, strong 
collective wage bargaining stabilized the collectivist and undifferentiated training re-
gime: almost all apprenticeships led to a similar kind of vocational qualification (Fach-
arbeiterbrief or Gesellenbrief) that was directly related to wage categories in collective 
wage agreements. As a consequence, the options for employers were more limited. They 
were forced by legal obligations, powerful unions and works councils to pay equally 
high wages to workers with similar vocational degrees, there was only one major type of 
degree, and works councils successfully fought the hiring of apprentices in less demand-
ing occupations (see above). These ‘beneficial constraints’ (Streeck 1991, 1992, 2004) 
forced employers to invest in skills and training.
The flexibilization of collective wage bargaining, together with the liberalization of 
labour markets, expanded the range of options for employers and loosened the link 
between vocational training and collective wage bargaining. First of all, the loosening 
occurred because of the simple fact that the coverage of collective wage agreements 
has been shrinking. Furthermore, the link between vocational degrees and collective 
wage agreements was loosened deliberately. In 2003, a new framework for collective 
wage agreements was agreed upon in the metal and electrical industry (Entgeltrahmen-
tarifvertrag). According to this framework, workers are not remunerated on the basis 
of their vocational qualifications anymore, but on the basis of their actual work. Un-
like before, employers can pay less to someone with a regular vocational degree work-
ing in a semi-skilled position, allaying the incentive to invest in the ‘upskilling’ of this 
person. Since the new framework was decided in consensus with the IG Metall union, 
representatives of employers’ associations are puzzled about the strong resistance to the 
introduction of two-year apprenticeships (Interview EMP-8). Unions claim they want 
to prevent employers from using less demanding apprenticeships as a means to lower 
wage costs (Interview UN-1, UN-3), but, according to the new wage bargaining frame-
work, the link between training and actual job content has been loosened anyway.
Third, fragmentation, disorganization and pluralization of interest representation have 
fuelled the increased contentiousness in training reform. The dissolution of ‘Germany 
Inc.’ (Höpner/Krempel 2004) is a symptom of the underlying growing heterogeneity of 
interests on the side of business. On the labour side, the emergence of new economic 
sectors has triggered new competition for members. Overall, we observe a tendency of 
particularistic interests becoming more important than collective interests, leading to 
the kind of contentious decision-making we have seen in the cases of two-year appren-
ticeships and the conflict over examinations. 
Finally, recent labour market reforms should exacerbate the problems of dualism that 
have accompanied declining firm-sponsored training. Just as the Hartz reforms have 
intensified the divide between workers in secure employment and the growing numbers 
in ‘atypical’ or ‘irregular’ work relationships (Martin/Thelen 2007; Iversen 2005), it is 
becoming clear that for a significant number of young people, the cobbled-together 
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‘transition system’ implemented by the state to ‘fill in’ for shortfalls in the supply of 
training places does not segue into stable employment (Beicht et al. 2007; Fuchs 2008). 
To the extent that large firms hunker down to train only for their own needs, we can 
anticipate that those who do not succeed in securing a high-prestige apprenticeship 
early on may also be at a higher risk of slipping into the growing underclass of irregular 
or atypical workers. 
Thelen, Busemeyer: From Collectivism towards Segmentalism 27
References
Allmendinger, Jutta,1989: Educational Systems and Labour Market Outcomes. In: European Socio-
logical Review 5, 231–250.
Anderson, Karen M./Anke Hassel, 2007: Pathways of Change in CMEs: Training Regimes in Germany 
and the Netherlands. Conference paper. American Political Science Association Meeting, Chi-
cago, August 27– September 1, 2007.
Baethge, Martin, 1999: Glanz und Elend des deutschen Korporatismus in der Berufsbildung. Die 
Mitbestimmung 4/1999.
 <http://www.boeckler.de/163_18761.html>
——, 2003: Das berufliche Bildungswesen in Deutschland am Beginn des 21. Jahrhunderts. In: Kai 
S. Cortina et al. (eds.), Das Bildungswesen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Reinbek: Rowohlt, 
525–580.
Baethge, Martin/Heike Solga/Markus Wieck, 2007: Berufsbildung im Umbruch: Signale eines überfäl-
ligen Aufbruchs. Berlin: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.
BDA, 2006: Ausbildung möglich machen! Programm zur Verbesserung der Rahmenbedingungen für 
mehr Ausbildung. Berlin: Bundesvereinigung der deutschen Arbeitgeberverbände.
——, 2007: Neue Strukturen in der dualen Ausbildung: Beschluss des BDA-Ausschusses Bildung/Be-
rufliche Bildung und des BDA-Arbeitskreises Berufliche Bildung. Berlin: Bundesvereinigung der 
Deutschen Arbeitgeberverbände.
Becker, Uwe, 2007: Open Systemness and Contested Reference Frames and Change: A Reformulation 
of the Varieties of Capitalism Theory. In: Socio-Economic Review 5, 261–286.
Beicht, Ursula/Michael Friedrich/Joachim Gerd Ulrich, 2007: Steiniger Weg in die Berufsausbildung: 
Werdegang von Jugendlichen nach Beendigung der allgemeinbildenden Schule. In: BWP 2/2007, 
5–9.
Bellaire, Edith, et al., 2006: Zweijährige Ausbildungsgänge: Eine Chance für Jugendliche mit schlechten 
Startchancen? Betriebsbefragungen zu neuen Berufen. Bielefeld: W. Bertelsmann Verlag.
BMBF, 2006: Berufsbildungsbericht 2006. Bonn: Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung.
——, 2008: Berufsbildungsbericht 2008. Bonn: Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung.
Brunner, Sonja/Friedrich Hubert Esser/Peter-Werner Kloas, 2006: Der Europäische Qualifikations-
rahmen: Bewertung durch die Spitzenverbände der deutschen Wirtschaft. In: BWP 2/2006, 
14–17.
Bundesregierung, 1985:  Unterrichtung durch die Bundesregierung: Berufsbildungsbericht 1985. Bun-
destagsdrucksache 10/2974.
Bundesregierung, 1996: Unterrichtung durch die Bundesregierung: Berufsbildungsbericht 1996. Bun-
destagsdrucksache 13/4555.
——, 1997: Reformprojekt Berufliche Bildung: Flexible Strukturen und moderne Berufe, Unterrichtung 
durch die Bundesregierung. Bundestagsdrucksache 13/7625.
Casey, Bernard, 1991: Recent Developments in the German Apprenticeship System. In: British Jour-
nal of Industrial Relations 29, 205–222.
Culpepper, Pepper D., 2003: Creating Cooperation: How States Develop Human Capital in Europe. 
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Cusack, Thomas/Torben Iversen/David Soskice, 2007: Economic Interests and the Origins of Elec-
toral Systems. In: Americal Political Science Review 101(3), 373–391.
DGB, 2003: Qualifizierte Ausbildung für alle: Wie der DGB die Berufsbildung reformieren will. Berlin: 
Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund, Bundesvorstand. 
——, 2006: Beschlüsse zur Bildungspolitik: 18. Ordentlicher DGB Bundeskongress, 22.–26.05.2006. 
Berlin: Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund, Bundesvorstand.
DIHK, 2007: „Dual mit Wahl“: Ein Modell der IHK-Organisation zur Reform der betrieblichen Ausbil-
dung. Berlin: Deutscher Industrie- und Handelskammertag. 
Dressel, Kathrin/Hannelore Plicht, 2006: Das neue Fachkonzept der Berufsvorbereitung und sein 
Einfluss auf die Übergangswege jugendlicher Ausbildungssuchender. In: Gesprächskreis Arbeit 
28 MPIfG Discussion Paper 08 / 13
und Qualifizierung Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung/IAB Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsfor-
schung der Bundesagentur für Arbeit (eds.), Übergänge zwischen Schule und Beruf und darauf 
bezogene Hilfesysteme in Deutschland. Bonn: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Wirtschafts- und sozial-
politisches Forschungs- und Beratungszentrum, Abteilung Arbeit und Sozialpolitik, 48–58.
Estevez-Abe, Margarita/Torben Iversen/David Soskice, 2001: Social Protection and the Formation of 
Skills: A Reinterpretation of the Welfare State. In: Peter A. Hall/David Soskice (eds.), Varieties 
of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage. New York: Oxford Uni-
versity Press.
Euler, Dieter/Eckart Severing, 2006: Flexible Ausbildungswege in der Berufsbildung. Nürnberg: 
Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung, Innovationskreis berufliche Bildung. 
Finegold, David/David Soskice (1988). The Failure of Training in Britain: Analysis and Prescription. 
Oxford Review of Economic Policy 4(3), 21–53.
Fuchs, Tatjana, 2008: Was ist gute Arbeit? Anforderungen an den Berufseinstieg aus Sicht der jungen 
Generation: Ergebnisse einer repräsentativen Befragung von Berufseinsteigern im Alter zwischen 
18 und 34 Jahren mit abgeschlossener Berufsausbildung im Auftrag der Bundesanstalt für Arbeits-
schutz und Arbeitsmedizin (BAuA) und dem Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Soziales (BMAS), 
in Zusammenarbeit mit Andreas Ebert. Stadtbergen: Internationales Institut für Empirische So-
zialökonomie (inifes).
Gesamtmetall, 2005: Die neuen M+E-Berufe: Informationen für Ausbilder. Berlin: Gesamtmetall.
Greinert, Wolf-Dietrich, 1998: Das „deutsche System“ der Berufsausbildung: Tradition, Organisation, 
Funktion. 3. Auflage. Baden-Baden: Nomos.
Hall, Peter A./David Soskice (eds.), 2001: Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of 
Comparative Advantage. New York: Oxford University Press.
Hartung, Silke/Klaus Schöngen, 2007: Zur Entwicklung der betrieblichen Ausbildungsbeteiligung in 
ausgewählten Dienstleistungen. In: Hans Dietrich/Eckart Severing (eds.): Zukunft der dualen 
Berufsausbildung: Wettbewerb der Bildungsgänge, Schriften zur Berufsbildungsforschung der Ar-
beitsgemeinschaft Berufsbildungsforschungsgesetz (AG BFN). Bielefeld: W. Bertelsmann Verlag, 
25–59.
Hassel, Anke/Britta Rehder, 2001: Institutional Change in the German Wage Bargaining System: The 
Role of Big Companies. MPIfG Working Paper 01/9. Cologne: Max Planck Institute for the Study 
of Societies.
Herrmann, Andrea, 2008: Rethinking the Link between Labour Market Flexibility and Corporate 
Competitiveness: A Critique of the Institutionalist Literature. In: Socio-Economic Review 6(4), 
637–669.
Hilbert, Josef/Helmi Südmersen/Hajo Weber, 1990: Berufsbildungspolitik: Geschichte – Organisa-
tion – Neuordnung. Opladen: Leske + Budrich.
Höpner, Martin/Lothar Krempel, 2004: The Politics of the German Company Network. In: Competi-
tion and Change 8(4), 339–356. 
IG Metall, 1991[1977]: Probleme mit der Stufenausbildung: Eine Analyse der Industriegewerkschaft 
Metall. In: Günter Pätzold (ed.), Quellen und Dokumente zur betrieblichen Berufsbildung 1945–
1990, 2. Halbband. Köln: Böhlau Verlag, 418–425.
——, 2007: Frankfurter Erklärung: Lernen und Arbeiten in europäischen Kernberufen. Frankfurt a.M.: 
IG Metall-Vorstand.
Innovationskreis berufliche Bildung, 2007: 10 Leitlinien zur Modernisierung und Strukturverbesse-
rung der beruflichen Bildung: Empfehlungen und Umsetzungsvorschläge. Berlin: Bundesministe-
rium für Bildung und Forschung.
Iversen, Torben, 2005: Capitalism, Democracy and Welfare. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Jaudas, Joachim, et al., 2004: Handwerk – nicht mehr Ausbilder der Nation? Übergangsprobleme von 
der handwerklichen Ausbildung ins Beschäftigungssystem. München: Institut für Sozialwissen-
schaftliche Forschung.
Thelen, Busemeyer: From Collectivism towards Segmentalism 29
Kitschelt, Herbert/Wolfgang Streeck (eds.), 2004: Germany: Beyond the Stable State. London: Frank 
Cass.
Kloas, Peter-Werner, 1997: Modularisierung in der beruflichen Bildung: Modebegriff, Streitthema oder 
konstruktiver Ansatz zur Lösung von Zukunftsproblemen? Berichte zur beruflichen Bildung 208. 
Bonn: Bundesinstitut für Berufsbildung.
Küssner, Karin/Esther Seng, 2006: Der Europäische Qualifikationsrahmen: Eine deutsche Stellung-
nahme. In: BWP 2/2006, 11–13.
Kume, Ikuo, 1998: Disparaged Success. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
KWB, 1999: Flexibilität und Wettbewerbsfähigkeit: Zukunftsorientierte Weiterentwicklung des Berufs-
bildungssystems. Bonn: Kuratorium der Deutschen Wirtschaft für Berufsbildung. 
——, 2006: Mehr Flexibilität, Durchlässigkeit, Praxisbezug: Neue Impulse für die berufliche Bildung. 
Bonn: Kuratorium der Deutschen Wirtschaft für Berufsbildung. 
Lacher, Michael, 2007: Einfache Arbeit in der Automobilindustrie: Ambivalente Kompetenzanforde-
rungen und ihre Herausforderung für die berufliche Bildung. In: Hans Dietrich/Eckart Severing 
(eds.), Zukunft der dualen Berufsausbildung: Wettbewerb der Bildungsgänge, Schriften zur Berufs-
bildungsforschung der Arbeitsgemeinschaft Berufsbildungsforschungsgesetz (AG BFN). Bielefeld: 
Bertelsmann, 83–96.
Martens, Kerstin/Klaus Dieter Wolf, 2006: Paradoxien der Neuen Staatsräson: Die Internationalisie-
rung der Bildungspolitik in der EU und der OECD. In: Zeitschrift für Internationale Beziehungen 
13, 145–176.
Martin, Cathie Jo/Kathleen Thelen, 2007: The State and Coordinated Capitalism: Contributions of 
the Public Sector to Social Solidarity in Post-industrial Societies. In: World Politics 60, 1–36.
Neubäumer, Renate, 1999: Der Ausbildungsstellenmarkt der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Eine theore-
tische und empirische Analyse. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot.
Neubäumer, Renate/Lutz Bellmann, 1999: Ausbildungsintensität und Ausbildungsbeteiligung von 
Betrieben: Theoretische Erklärungen und empirische Ergebnisse auf der Basis des IAB-Be-
triebspanels 1997. In: Doris Beer (ed.), Die wirtschaftlichen Folgen von Aus- und Weiterbildung. 
München: Hampp, 9–41.
Reinberg, Alexander/Markus Hummel, 2006: Zwanzig Jahre Bildungsgesamtrechnung: Entwicklungen 
im Bildungs- und Erwerbssystem Ost- und Westdeutschlands bis zum Jahr 2000. Nürnberg: Insti-
tut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung der Bundesagentur für Arbeit.
Schavan, Annette, 2006: Rede der Bundesministerin für Bildung und Forschung, Dr. Annette Schavan, 
MdB, anlässlich der verbundenen Debatte zum Thema „Neue Dynamik für Ausbildung“ im Deut-
schen Bundestag, 20. Oktober 2006. Berlin: Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung. 
 <http://www.bmbf.de/pub/mr_20061020.pdf>
Silvia, Stephen J./ Wolfgang Schroeder, 2007: Why Are German Employers Associations Declining? 
Arguments and Evidence. In: Comparative Political Studies 40, 1433–1459.
Soskice, David, 1994: Reconciling Markets and Institutions: The German Apprenticeship System. In: 
Lisa M. Lynch (ed.), Training and the Private Sector: International Comparisons. Chicago: Uni-
versity of Chicago Press, 25–60.
Stooß, Friedemann, 1997: Reformbedarf in der beruflichen Bildung, Gutachten im Auftrag des Lands 
Nordrhein-Westfalen. Düsseldorf: Ministerium für Wirtschaft und Mittelstand, Technologie 
und Verkehr des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen.
Streeck, Wolfgang, 1989: Skills and the Limits of Neo-Liberalism. Work, Employment & Society 3, 
90–104.
——, 1991: On the Institutional Conditions of Diversified Quality Production. In: Egon Matzner/
Wolfgang Streeck (eds.), Beyond Keynesianism. Aldershot: Edward Elgar.
——, 1992: Social Institutions and Economic Performance: Studies of Industrial Relations in Advanced 
Capitalist Economies. London: Sage.
——, 1996: Lean Production in the German Automobile Industry. In: Suzanne Berger/Ronald Dore 
(eds.), National Diversity and Global Capitalism. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
30 MPIfG Discussion Paper 08 / 13
——, 2004: Educating Capitalists: A Rejoinder to Wright and Tsakalotos. In: Socio-Economic Re-
view 2, 425–438.
——, 2009: Re-Forming Capitalism: Institutional Change in ther German Political Economy. New York: 
Oxford University Press, forthcoming.
Streeck, Wolfgang, et al., 1987: Steuerung und Regulierung der beruflichen Bildung: Die Rolle der So-
zialpartner in der Ausbildung und beruflichen Weiterbildung in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. 
Berlin: edition sigma.
Streeck, Wolfgang/Philippe C. Schmitter, 1985: Private Interest Government: Beyond Market and State. 
London: Sage.
Streeck, Wolfgang/Kathleen Thelen, 2005: Introduction: Institutional Change in Advanced Politi-
cal Economies. In: Wolfgang Streeck/Kathleen Thelen (eds.), Beyond Continuity: Institutional 
Change in Advanced Political Economies. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1–39.
Thelen, Kathleen, 2004: How Institutions Evolve: The Political Economy of Skills in Germany, Britain, 
the United States and Japan. New York: Cambridge University Press.
——, 2005: Training and Skill Formation. In: Geoffrey Jones/Jonathan Zeitlin (eds.), The Oxford 
Handbook of Business History. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
——, 2007: Contemporary Challenges to the German Vocational Training System. In: Regulation & 
Governance 1, 247–260.
Thelen, Kathleen/Ikuo Kume, 1999: The Rise of Nonmarket Training Regimes: Germany and Japan 
Compared. In: Journal of Japanese History 25(1), 33–64.
Thelen, Kathleen/Christa van Wijnbergen, 2003: The Paradox of Globalization: Labor Relations in 
Germany and Beyond. In: Comparative Political Studies 36(8), 859–880.
Trampusch, Christine, 2006: Mit Bologna ist es nicht vorbei: Die EU-Berufsbildungspolitik und die 
Europäisierung der deutschen Berufsbildungspolitik. Unpublished Manuscript. Cologne: Max 
Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.
Vogler-Ludwig, Kurt, et al., 2003: Ausbildung für einfache Berufe: Identifizierung von Tätigkeitsfeldern 
mit weniger komplexen Anforderungen als Basis zur Schaffung neuer anerkannter Ausbildungsbe-
rufe mit abgesenktem Anforderungsniveau: Kurzfassung des Endberichts, Gutachten für das Bun-
desministerium für Wirtschaft und Arbeit. München: Economix Research & Consulting.
Walden, Günter/Hermann Herget, 2002: Nutzen der betrieblichen Ausbildung für Betriebe: Erste 
Ergebnisse einer empirischen Untersuchung. In: BWP 6/2002, 32–37.
Zedler, Reinhard, 1995: Zweijährige Ausbildungsberufe in der Metall-Industrie. In: IBV-Informa-
tionen 49, 4333–4335.
Zeller, Beate, 2007: Neue Qualifikationsanforderungen an der Schnittstelle von einfacher Arbeit und 
Facharbeit am Beispiel der Elektroindustrie. In: Hans Dietrich/Eckart Severing (eds.): Zukunft 
der dualen Berufsausbildung: Wettbewerb der Bildungsgänge, Schriften zur Berufsbildungsfor-
schung der Arbeitsgemeinschaft Berufsbildungsforschungsgesetz (AG BFN). Bielefeld: W. Bertels-
mann Verlag, 61–82.

Recent Titles in the Publication Series of the MPIfG
MPIfG Discussion Papers
DP 08/12
M. Höpner
Usurpation statt Delegation: 
Wie der EuGH die 
Binnenmarktintegration 
radikalisiert und warum er 
politischer Kontrolle bedarf
DP 08/11
M. Kahancová
Embedding Multinationals 
in Postsocialist Host 
Countries: Social Interaction 
and the Compatibility of 
Organizational Interests with 
Host-Country Institutions 
DP 08/10
A. Schäfer
Krisentheorien der 
Demokratie: Unregierbarkeit, 
Spätkapitalismus und 
Postdemokratie 
DP 08/9
A. M. Herrmann
Choosing and Successfully 
Sustaining Competitive 
Strategies in the European 
Pharmaceutical Industry
DP 08/8
L. Dobusch, S. Quack
Epistemic Communities and 
Social Movements:
Transnational Dynamics in the 
Case of Creative Commons
DP 08/7
U. Dolata
Das Internet und die 
Transformation der 
Musikindustrie
MPIfG Working Papers
WP 08/6
W. Streeck
Flexible Markets, Stable 
Societies?
WP 08/5
C. Deutschmann
Der kollektive „Buddenbrooks-
Effekt“: Die Finanzmärkte und 
die Mittelschichten
WP 08/4
J. Beckert, W. Streeck
Economic Sociology  
and Political Economy:  
A Programmatic Perspective
WP 08/3
W. Streeck
Industrial Relations Today: 
Reining in Flexibility
WP 08/2
I. Troy, R. Werle
Uncertainty and the Market  
for Patents
WP 08/1
G. Möllering
Inviting or Avoiding Deception 
through Trust? Conceptual 
Exploration of an Ambivalent 
Relationship
WP 07/5
A. Goerres
Can We Reform the Welfare 
State in Times of “Grey“ 
Majorities? The Myth of an 
Electoral Opposition between 
Younger and Older Voters in 
Germany
MPIfG Books
S. Burkhart
Blockierte Politik: Ursachen 
und Folgen von „Divided 
Government“ in Deutschland
Campus 2008
M. Höpner, A. Schäfer (Hg.)
Die Politische Ökonomie der 
europäischen Integration
Campus, 2008
L. Dobusch
Windows versus Linux: Markt – 
Organisation – Pfad
VS Verlag für Sozialwissen-
schaften, 2008
C. Woll
Firm Interests: How 
Governments Shape Business 
Lobbying on Global Trade 
Cornell University Press, 2008
P. Manow
Im Schatten des Königs: 
Die politische Anatomie 
demokratischer Repräsentation
Suhrkamp, 2008
J. Beckert
Inherited Wealth
Princeton University Press, 2008
B. Harrington
Pop Finance: Investment Clubs 
and the New Investor Populism
Princeton University Press, 2008 
J. Beckert, R. Diaz-Bone,  
H. Ganßmann (Hg.) 
Märkte als soziale Strukturen
Campus, 2007
Ordering Information
MPIfG Discussion Papers
Order printed copies from the MPIfG (you will be 
billed) or download PDF file from the MPIfG website 
(free).
MPIfG Working Papers
Order printed copies from the MPIfG (you will be 
billed) or download PDF file from the MPIfG website 
(free).
MPIfG Books
At bookstores; abstracts on the MPIfG website.
www.mpifg.de
Go to Publications.
New Titles
Consult our website for the most complete and up-
to-date information about MPIfG publications and 
publications by MPIfG researchers. To sign up for 
newsletters and mailings, please go to Service on the 
MPIfG website. Upon request to info@mpifg.de, we 
will be happy to send you our Recent Publications 
brochure.
ERPA
MPIfG Discussion Papers and MPIfG Working Papers 
in the field of European integration research are 
included in the European Research Papers Archive 
(ERPA) which offers full-text search options:  
http://eiop.or.at/erpa.
